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The	  limits	  of	  competence-­‐based	  teacher	  education1	  
The	   idea	   that	   teachers	   should	   be	   competent	   at	  what	   they	   do,	   is	   difficult	   to	   contest.	   Perhaps	   this	  
partly	   explains	   the	   popular	   appeal	   of	   competence-­‐based	   approaches	   to	   teaching	   and	   teacher	  
education	  which,	   in	   recent	   decades,	   have	   spread	   rapidly	   across	  many	   countries	   around	   the	  world	  
(for	   an	   overview	   and	   critical	   analysis	   see	   Heilbronn	   2008,	   chapter	   2).	   National	   frameworks	   for	  
teacher	   education	   are	   increasingly	   being	   formulated	   in	   terms	   of	   competences,	   and	   even	   the	  
European	   Commission	   has	   recently	   produced	   a	   set	   of	   Common	   European	   Principles	   for	   Teacher	  
Competences	  and	  Qualifications,2	  meant	  to	  stimulate	  "reflection	  about	  actions	  that	  can	  be	  taken	  at	  
Member	  State	  level	  and	  how	  the	  European	  Union	  might	  support	  these"	  –	  as	  it	  was	  formulated	  in	  the	  
2007	  document	  Improving	  the	  Quality	  of	  Teacher	  Education3.	  The	  idea	  of	  competence,	  however,	  has	  
more	   than	   just	   rhetorical	   appeal.	   Its	   introduction	   marks	   an	   important	   shift	   in	   focus	   from	   what	  
teachers	  should	  know	  to	  what	  they	  should	  be	  able	  to	  do,	  and	  potentially	  even	  to	  how	  they	  should	  
be.	   In	  this	  regard	  the	   idea	  of	  competence	  represents	  a	  more	  practical	  and	  more	  holistic	  outlook	   in	  
that	   it	   encompasses	   knowledge,	   skills	   and	   professional	   action,	   rather	   than	   seeing	   such	   action	   as	  
either	   the	  application	  of	   knowledge	  –	  an	   idea	   captured	   in	  evidence-­‐based	  approaches	   to	   teaching	  
and	   teacher	   education	   (see	   Biesta	   2007;	   2010a)	   –	   or	   the	   enactment	   of	   skills	   –	   an	   approach	  
particularly	  prominent	  in	  those	  situations	  where	  teachers	  are	  supposed	  to	  pick	  up	  their	  skills	  'on	  the	  
shop	  floor,'	  so	  to	  speak,	  rather	  than	  that	  they	  are	  thought	  to	  be	  in	  need	  of	  any	  proper	  professional	  
education.	  
	  
Yet	  the	  idea	  of	  competence	  is	  not	  without	  problems,	  and	  also	  not	  without	  risks	  (see	  Mulder,	  Weigel	  
&	  Collins	  2007;	  Biesta	  &	  Priestley	  2013).	  The	  risks	  have	  to	  do	  with	   the	  way	   in	  which	  the	  notion	  of	  
competence	   is	   defined	   and	   understood;	   the	   problems	   with	   how	   it	   is	   being	   implemented	   and	  
enacted.	  With	   regard	   to	   matters	   of	   definition	   competence	   can,	   on	   the	   one	   hand,	   be	   seen	   as	   an	  
integrative	  approach	  to	  professional	  action	  that	  highlights	  the	  complex	  combination	  of	  knowledge,	  
skills,	  understandings,	  values,	  and	  purposes	  (for	  such	  a	  definition	  see	  Deakin	  Crick	  2008,	  p.313).	   In	  
such	   an	   interpretation	   a	   competence-­‐based	   approach	   clearly	   has	   the	   potential	   to	   promote	   the	  
professional	  agency	  of	  teachers.	  Yet	  many	  commentators	  have	  shown	  that	  the	  idea	  of	  competence	  
actually	   steers	   the	   field	   of	   teaching	   and	   teacher	   education	   in	   the	   opposite	   direction	   through	   its	  
emphasis	   on	   performance,	   standards,	   measurement	   and	   control,	   thus	   reducing	   and	   ultimately	  
undermining	  the	  agency	  of	  teachers	  (see	  Heilbronn	  2008,	  pp.	  21-­‐25;	  see	  also	  Winch	  2000;	  Priestley,	  
Robinson	  &	  Biesta	  2012).	  
	  
With	  regard	  to	  the	  practical	  implementation	  of	  the	  idea	  of	  competence,	  particularly	  within	  the	  field	  
of	  teacher	  education,	  there	  are	  a	  number	  of	  additional	  problems.	  One	  has	  to	  do	  with	  the	  fact	  that	  
any	  attempt	  to	  describe	  in	  full	  detail	  everything	  that	  teachers	  should	  be	  competent	  at,	  runs	  the	  risk	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  I	  would	  like	  to	  thank	  the	  editors	  of	  this	  volume	  for	  their	  helpful	  feedback	  and	  for	  including	  me	  in	  this	  project.	  
2	  http://ec.europa.eu/education/policies/2010/doc/principles_en.pdf	  [Last	  accessed	  2	  August	  2012]	  
3	  http://ec.europa.eu/education/com392_en.pdf	  [Last	  accessed	  2	  August	  2012]	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of	  generating	  lists	  that	  are	  far	  too	  long	  and	  far	  too	  detailed.	  The	  existence	  of	  such	  lists	  can	  result	  in	  a	  
situation	  where	   teacher	   education	   turns	   into	   a	   tick	   box	   exercise	   focused	   on	   establishing	  whether	  
students	  have	  managed	  to	  achieve	  everything	  on	  the	  list.	  This	  not	  only	  can	  lead	  easily	  to	  a	  disjointed	  
curriculum	   and	   an	   instrumental	   approach	   to	   the	   education	   of	   teachers,	   but	   also	   runs	   the	   risk	   of	  
turning	   teacher	   education	   from	   a	   collective	   experience	   to	   a	   plethora	   of	   individual	   learning	  
trajectories	  where	  students	  are	  just	  working	  towards	  the	  achievement	  of	  their	  'own'	  competencies,	  
without	  a	  need	  to	  interact	  with	  or	  be	  exposed	  to	  fellow	  students.	  
	  
A	   second	   major	   problem	   is	   that	   competencies	   are	   always	   orientated	   towards	   the	   past	   and	   the	  
present.	  It	  is,	  after	  all,	  only	  possible	  to	  describe	  what	  a	  teacher	  needs	  to	  be	  competent	  at	  in	  relation	  
to	   situations	   that	   are	   already	   known.	   Yet	   teaching	   is	   in	   a	   very	   fundamental	   sense	   always	   open	  
towards	   the	   future.	  There	   is	  a	  danger,	   therefore,	   that	  a	  competence-­‐based	  curriculum	   for	   teacher	  
education	  ties	  students	  too	  much	  to	  the	  current	  situation	  –	  or	  to	  a	  particular	   interpretation	  of	  the	  
current	   situation	   –	   rather	   than	   that	   it	   prepares	   them	   sufficiently	   for	   meaningful	   action	   in	   an	  
unknown	  future.	  This,	  as	  I	  will	  argue	  in	  more	  detail	  below,	  is	  not	  meant	  as	  an	  argument	  that	  teachers	  
need	   flexible	   skills	   (on	   this	   idea,	   see	   Biesta,	   in	   press),	   but	   as	   an	   argument	   for	   the	   central	   role	   of	  
judgement	  in	  teaching.	  
	  
All	  this	  feeds	  into	  what	  is	  perhaps	  the	  most	  important	  problem	  with	  and	  limitation	  of	  a	  competence-­‐
based	  approach	   to	   teacher	  education,	  which	   is	   the	   fact	   that	   good	   teachers	  not	   simply	  need	   to	  be	  
able	   to	  do	  all	   kind	  of	   things	   –	   in	   this	   regard	   it	   is	   true	   that	   they	  need	   to	  be	   competent	   (and	  being	  
competent	  is	  a	  better	  formulation	  than	  having	  competences)	  –	  but	  that	  they	  also	  need	  to	  be	  able	  to	  
judge	   which	   competences	   should	   be	   utilised	   in	   the	   always	   concrete	   situations	   in	   which	   teachers	  
work.	  If	  competences	  in	  a	  sense	  provide	  teachers	  with	  a	  repertoire	  of	  possibilities,	  there	  is	  still	  the	  
challenge	   to	   judge	   which	   of	   those	   possibilities	   should	   be	   actualized	   in	   order	   to	   realize	   good	   and	  
meaningful	  teaching.	  This	  is	  why	  I	  wish	  to	  suggest	  that	  while	  the	  possession	  of	  competences	  may	  be	  
a	  necessary	   condition	   for	  good	  teaching,	   it	   can	  never	  be	  a	  sufficient	   condition.	  And	  the	   reason	   for	  
this	   lies	   in	   the	   fact	   that	   good	   teaching	   requires	   judgement	   about	  what	   an	   educationally	   desirable	  
course	  of	  action	  is	  in	  this	  concrete	  situation	  with	  these	  concrete	  students	  at	  this	  particular	  stage	  in	  
their	  educational	  trajectory.	  	  
	  
In	   its	  shortest	  formula	  we	  might	  say,	  therefore,	  that	  "good	  teaching	  =	  competences	  +	   judgement".	  
But	   this	   raises	  a	  number	  of	   further	  questions.	  One	   is	   'Why	  do	  we	  need	   judgement	   in	   teaching?'	  A	  
second	  is	   'What	  kinds	  of	   judgement	  do	  we	  need	  in	  teaching?'	  And	  the	  third	  is	   'How	  might	  we	  help	  
teachers	   to	  become	  capable	  of	  such	   judgements?	  –	  which	   is	   the	  question	  of	   teacher	  education.	   In	  
what	   follows	   I	   aim	   to	   provide	   an	   answer	   to	   these	   questions.	   Through	   this	   I	   will	   articulate	   a	  
conception	   of	   teacher	   education	   that	   can	   be	   seen	   as	   an	   alternative	   for	   competence-­‐based	  
approaches.	  This	  conception	  focuses	  on	  the	  ways	  in	  which,	  through	  teacher	  education,	  teachers	  can	  
enhance	   their	   ability	   for	  making	   situated	   judgements	   about	  what	   is	   educationally	   desirable,	   both	  
with	  regard	  to	  the	  ‘ends’	  and	  the	  ‘means’	  of	  education.4	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	   As	   I	   will	   try	   to	   make	   clear	   throughout	   this	   chapter,	   my	   ambition	   is	   not	   to	   specify	   what	   an	  
educationally	  desirable	  course	  of	  action	   is,	  but	   to	  highlight	   the	   fact	   that	   in	  education	  the	  question	  
about	   what	   is	   educationally	   desirable	   –	   both	   with	   regard	   to	   the	   aims	   and	   ends	   (the	   purpose	   of	  
education)	   and	  with	   regard	   to	   the	  ways	   of	   proceeding	   (the	   ‘means’	   of	   education)	   –	   is	   inevitable.	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As	   I	  will	  explain	   in	  more	  detail	  below,	   I	  refer	  to	  this	  approach	  as	  a	  virtue-­‐based	  approach	   (see	  also	  
Biesta	  2013a),	  which	  is	  the	  reason	  why	  I	  will	  emphasise	  the	  need	  for	  teachers	  to	  develop	  educational	  
virtuosity.	   I	  will	  preface	  my	  discussion	  with	  an	  exploration	  of	  the	  particular	  nature	  of	  teaching	  and	  
education	  more	  generally.	  
	  
On	  the	  'nature'	  of	  education:	  Teleology	  and	  the	  three	  domains	  of	  educational	  purpose	  
In	  order	  to	  understand	  why	  there	  is	  a	  need	  for	  judgement	  in	  teaching,	  we	  need	  to	  begin	  by	  looking	  
more	  closely	  at	   the	  particular	  nature	  of	  educational	  processes	  and	  practices.	   In	  recent	  years	   it	  has	  
become	   fashionable	   to	   do	   so	   with	   the	   help	   of	   the	   language	   of	   learning.	   Yet,	   as	   I	   have	   argued	  
elsewhere	   in	  more	  detail	   (see	  particularly	  Biesta	  2004;	  2006;	  2010b),	   the	   language	  of	   learning	   is	  a	  
very	  limited	  and	  to	  a	  certain	  degree	  even	  inadequate	  language	  to	  capture	  what	  education	  is	  about.	  
Perhaps	  the	  quickest	  way	  to	  highlight	  what	  the	  problem	  is,	  is	  to	  say	  that	  the	  point	  of	  education	  is	  not	  
that	  students	  learn,	  but	  that	  they	  learn	  something,	  that	  they	  learn	  it	  for	  particular	  reasons	  and	  that	  
they	   learn	   it	   from	   someone.	   Questions	   of	   content,	   purpose	   and	   relationships	   are	   precisely	   what	  
distinguishes	   (a	   general	   discussion	   about)	   learning	   from	   (a	   concrete	   discussion	   about)	   education.	  
Education,	   to	   put	   it	   differently,	   is	   not	   designed	   so	   that	   children	   and	   young	   people	  might	   learn	   –	  
which	  they	  can	  anywhere	  –	  but	  so	  that	  they	  might	  learn	  particular	  things	  (in	  the	  broad	  sense	  of	  the	  
word)	  within	  particular	  relationships	  and	  for	  particular	  reasons.	  
	  
The	   latter	   dimension	   –	   which	   concerns	   the	   question	   of	   purpose	   –	   is	   the	   most	   central	   and	   most	  
fundamental	   one,	   because	   it	   is	   only	   once	   we	   have	   articulated	   what	   we	   want	   our	   educational	  
arrangements	  and	  efforts	   to	  bring	  about,	   that	  we	   can	  make	  decisions	  about	   relevant	   content	   and	  
about	  the	  kind	  of	  relationships	  that	  are	  most	  conducive	  for	  this.	  Without	  a	  sense	  of	  purpose,	  there	  
may	  be	  learning	  but	  not	  education.	  This	  is	  why	  we	  might	  adopt	  the	  stronger	  claim	  that	  education	  is	  
not	   simply	  a	  practice	   that	   is	  characterised	   by	   the	  presence	  of	  purposes,	  but	  one	   that	   is	   actually	   a	  
practice	   constituted	   by	   purpose(s)	   (see	   Biesta	   2010a,b).	   In	   philosophical	   language	   education	   can	  
therefore	  be	   seen	  as	   a	   teleological	   practice,	   that	   is,	   a	  practice	   constituted	  by	  a	   telos.	   This	   already	  
provides	  us	  with	  one	  important	  reason	  why	  judgement	  is	  needed	  in	  education,	  as	  we	  need	  to	  come	  
to	   some	   kind	   of	   understanding	   of	  what	   the	   purpose	   of	   our	   educational	   activities	   should	   be.	   (It	   is	  
useful	  here	  to	  follow	  the	  distinction	  suggested	  by	  Richard	  Peters	  between	  the	  purpose	  of	  an	  activity,	  
which	  refers	  to	  the	  reason	  for	  it,	  and	  the	  aims	  of	  an	  activity,	  which	  concern	  the	  concrete	  targets	  one	  
wishes	  to	  achieve;	  see	  Peters	  1973,	  p.13.)	  	  
	  
But	  here	  we	  encounter	  an	  additional	  reason	  why	  judgement	  is	  needed	  in	  education,	  which	  has	  to	  do	  
with	  the	  fact	  that	  in	  education	  the	  question	  of	  purpose	  is	  a	  multi-­‐dimensional	  question.	  This	  means	  
that	  there	  is	  not	  one	  single	  purpose	  of	  education	  but	  that	  there	  are	  a	  number	  of	  different	  domains	  
of	  educational	  purpose	  (on	  this	  thesis	  see	  particularly	  Biesta	  2009;	  2010b).	  The	  idea	  here	  is	  a	  simple	  
one,	  but	  it	  has	  some	  profound	  implications	  for	  understanding	  the	  role	  of	  judgements	  in	  education.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
What	  I	  seek	  to	  do	  is	  to	  highlight	  the	  dimensions	  of	  this	  question,	  but	  it	  is	  up	  to	  educators	  in	  concrete	  
situations	  to	  engage	  with	  the	  question	  of	  what	  is	  desirable	  and	  formulate	  and	  justify	  their	  situated	  
answers,	   in	   dialogue	  with	  other	   ‘stakeholders’	   in	   the	  process.	  My	   ambition	   is	   to	   ensure	   that	   such	  
deliberations	  and	  justifications	  play	  a	  central	  role	  in	  teaching	  and	  hence	  also	  have	  a	  central	  position	  
in	  the	  education	  of	  teachers.	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One	  way	   to	   understand	   the	  multi-­‐dimensional	   nature	   of	   educational	   purpose	   is	   to	   start	   from	   the	  
question	  how	  education	   functions,	   that	   is,	  what	   our	   educational	   actions	   and	   activities	   effect.	  One	  
important	  function	  of	  education	  lies	  in	  the	  domain	  of	  qualification.	  Here	  education	  is	  concerned	  with	  
the	   transmission	  and	  acquisition	  of	   knowledge,	   skills,	   dispositions	   and	  understandings	   that	  qualify	  
children	  and	  young	  people	  for	  doing	  certain	  things.	  Such	  doing	  can	  either	  be	  understood	  in	  a	  narrow	  
sense,	  for	  example	  becoming	  qualified	  to	  perform	  a	  certain	  task	  or	  job.	  Or	  it	  can	  be	  understood	  in	  a	  
much	   wider	   sense,	   such	   as	   that	   education	   qualifies	   children	   and	   young	   people	   to	   live	   a	   life	   in	  
modern,	  complex	  societies.	  
	  
Some	  would	  say	  that	  this	  is	  the	  only	  dimension	  in	  which	  education	  functions,	  that	  is,	  that	  education	  
is	  basically	  about	  getting	  knowledge	  and	  skills.	  Others	  would	  highlight	  however	  that	  education	  is	  not	  
just	   about	   qualification	   but	   also	   about	   socialisation,	   that	   is,	   about	   initiating	   children	   and	   young	  
people	  into	  existing	  traditions,	  cultures,	  ways	  of	  doing	  and	  ways	  of	  being.	  Education	  partly	  does	  this	  
deliberately,	  for	  example	  in	  the	  form	  of	  professional	  socialisation,	  or	  socialisation	  into	  the	  culture	  of	  
democracy.	   The	   idea	   of	   the	   hidden	   curriculum	   (Giroux	   &	   Purpel	   1983)	   suggests,	   however,	   that	  
socialisation	   also	   happens	   behind	   the	   back	   of	   teachers	   and	   students,	   thus	   reproducing	   existing	  
traditions,	   cultures,	   ways	   of	   doing	   and	   being	   often,	   though	   not	   necessarily,	   in	   ways	   that	   benefit	  
some	  more	  than	  others,	  thus	  contributing	  to	  the	  reproduction	  of	  material	  and	  social	  inequalities.	  In	  
addition	  to	  qualification	  and	  socialisation	  I	  wish	  to	  argue	  –	  and	  have	  argued	  elsewhere	  (Biesta	  2009;	  
2010b)	  –	   that	  any	  educational	  activity	  or	  effort	  always	  also	   impacts	  on	   the	  person,	   that	   is,	  on	   the	  
qualities	   of	   the	   person	   and	  on	   personal	   qualities.	  Here	  we	   can	   think,	   for	   example,	   of	   the	  ways	   in	  
which	  through	  the	  acquisition	  of	  knowledge	  and	  understanding	  individuals	  become	  empowered.	  Or	  
how,	   through	   adopting	   particular	   culture	   patterns,	   they	   become	   disempowered.	   This	   is	   a	   domain	  
where	   we	   can	   find	   such	   qualities	   as	   autonomy,	   criticality,	   empathy	   or	   compassion,	   that	   all	   are	  
potential	  'effects'	  of	  education.	  I	  have	  suggested	  to	  refer	  to	  this	  third	  dimension	  as	  subjectification,	  
as	   it	  concerns	  processes	  of	  being/becoming	  a	  human	  subject.	   (For	  the	  particular	  reason	  to	  use	  the	  
notion	  of	  'subject'	  rather	  than,	  for	  example,	  the	  notion	  of	  ‘person’	  or	  ‘identity’	  see	  particularly	  Biesta	  
2010b,	  chapter	  4;	  see	  also	  Biesta	  2006;	  2013b.)	  
	  
If	   it	   is	  granted	  that	  qualification,	  socialisation	  and	  subjectification	  are	  three	  domains	  or	  dimensions	  
in	   which	   education	   functions	   –	   which	  means	   nothing	  more	   that	   when	   we	   teach	   we	   always	   have	  
some	   impact	   in	  each	  of	   these	   three	  domains	  –	   then	   it	   could	  be	  argued	   that	   as	  educators	  we	  also	  
need	   to	   take	   responsibility	   for	   the	   impact	   of	   our	   educational	   actions	   in	   relation	   to	   these	   three	  
domains.	  That	  is	  why	  the	  distinction	  between	  qualification,	  socialisation	  and	  subjectification	  cannot	  
only	   be	   used	   in	   an	   analytical	   way	   –	   that	   is,	   to	   analyse	   the	   'impact'	   of	   particular	   educational	  
arrangements	   –	   but	   also	   in	   a	   programmatic	   sense	   –	   that	   is,	   to	   articulate	   what	   it	   one	   wishes	   to	  
achieve	  or	   bring	   about	   through	  one's	   educational	   efforts.	   That	   is	  why	   they	   can	   also	  been	   seen	   as	  
three	   purposes	   of	   education.	   Given	   that	   within	   each	   domain	   there	   can	   actually	   be	   significantly	  
different	   views,	   for	   example,	   about	   what	   knowledge	   is,	   what	   tradition	   or	   culture	   or,	   or	   what	   it	  
means	   to	  be	  a	  human	  subject,	   I	  prefer	   to	   refer	   to	   them	  as	   three	  domains	  of	  educational	  purpose.	  
And	   the	  suggestion	  here	   is	   that	   those	  who	  have	  a	   responsibility	   for	  education	  –	  be	   they	   teachers,	  
policy	  makers,	  politicians,	  or	  students	  themselves	  –	  need	  to	  articulate	  and	  justify	  what	  they	  seek	  to	  
achieve	  in	  relation	  to	  each	  of	  these	  domains.	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Why	  do	  we	  need	  judgement	  in	  teaching?	  Purpose,	  form,	  balance,	  trade-­‐offs,	  and	  pragmatism	  
Against	  this	  background	  we	  are	  now	  in	  a	  position	  to	  answer	  the	  question	  why	  judgement	  is	  needed	  
in	  education.	  The	  answer	  to	  this	  question	  is	  threefold.	  We	  first	  of	  all	  need	  judgement	  in	  relation	  to	  
the	  question	  what	   the	  purpose	   of	   our	   educational	   arrangements	   and	   activities	   is	   to	   be	   –	   and	   this	  
question,	   as	  mentioned,	   poses	   itself	   as	   a	  multi-­‐dimensional	   question,	   so	   that	  we	   need	   to	   give	   an	  
answer	  to	  what	  it	  is	  we	  wish	  to	  achieve	  and	  what	  we	  wish	  our	  students	  to	  achieve	  in	  relation	  to	  each	  
of	  the	  three	  domains	  of	  educational	  purpose	  –	  a	  task	  that	  also	  requires	  that	  we	  answer	  the	  question	  
why	   it	   is	   that	  we	  want	   to	  achieve	   this;	  which	   is	  a	  matter	  of	   justification.	  The	  reason	  that	  we	  need	  
judgement	  here,	  is	  because	  any	  answer	  to	  this	  question	  is	  not	  a	  matter	  of	  stating	  facts,	  but	  involves	  
values	   and	   hence	   normative	   preferences.	   Science	   and	   research	   can	   therefore	   never	   provide	   an	  
answer	   to	   the	   question	   what	   education	   ought	   to	   be	   for	   in	   relation	   to	   the	   three	   domains	   of	  
educational	   purpose.	  What	   it	   can	   do,	   at	   most,	   is	   provide	   information	   that	   might	   be	   relevant	   for	  
understanding	  what	  is	  possible	  and	  feasible	  in	  each	  of	  the	  domains.	  Hence	  already	  at	  the	  very	  start	  
of	  any	  educational	  endeavour	  we	  find	  a	  need	  for	  judgement.	  But	  it	  is	  not	  that	  we	  only	  need	  to	  come	  
to	  a	  judgement	  about	  the	  purpose	  of	  our	  educational	  endeavours	  before	  we	  engage	  with	  them.	  The	  
question	  of	  what	   it	   is	  we	  seek	  to	  achieve	  returns	  again	  and	  again	  as	  a	  very	  concrete	  question	  that	  
needs	   to	   be	   answered	   in	   relation	   to	   concrete	   and,	   in	   a	   certain	   sense,	   always	   unique	   individual	  
students	   in	  concrete	  and	  in	  a	  certain	  sense	  unique	  situations.	   It	   is	  therefore	  a	  question	  that	   lies	  at	  
the	  heart	  of	  teaching	  and	  of	  what	  it	  means	  to	  be	  a	  teacher.	  
	  
A	  second	  'moment'	  of	  judgement	  has	  to	  do	  with	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  we	  organise	  and	  enact	  education,	  
that	  is,	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  forms	  of	  educational	  action.	  This	  has	  to	  do	  with	  another	  characteristic	  that	  
makes	   education	   different	   from	  many	   other	   human	   fields	   and	   practices,	   namely	   the	   fact	   that	   in	  
education	  there	  is	  an	  internal	  relationship	  between	  means	  and	  ends.	  The	  means	  of	  education	  –	  the	  
ways	  in	  which	  we	  act,	  the	  things	  we	  say	  and	  how	  we	  say	  them,	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  we	  relate	  to	  our	  
students	   and	   let	   them	   relate	   to	   each	   other	   –	   can	   never	   be	   thought	   of	   as	  mere	   instruments	   that	  
should	   just	   effectively	   bring	   about	   certain	   'outcomes.'	   The	   reason	   for	   this	   lies	   in	   the	   fact	   that	  
students	  not	  only	  learn	  from	  what	  we	  say	  but	  also,	  and	  often	  more	  so,	  from	  how	  we	  say	  it	  and	  from	  
what	  we	  do.	  This	  means	  that	  our	  ways	  of	  doing	   in	  education	  do	  not	   just	  need	  to	  be	  effective	  (and	  
sometimes	   that	   is	   not	   even	   a	   relevant	   criterion	   at	   all;	   see	   below).	  We	   always	   also	   need	   to	   judge	  
whether	  they	  are	  educationally	  appropriate	  –	  which	  requires	  that	  we	  reflect	  on	  what	  our	  students	  
might	  learn	  or	  pick	  up	  from	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  we	  do	  things	  and	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  we	  organise	  and	  
arrange	   education.	   This	   is	   not	   to	   suggest	   that	   question	   about	   how	   our	   educational	   actions	  might	  
'impact'	   in	   the	   different	   domains	   in	  which	   education	   functions	   are	   not	   relevant.	  On	   the	   contrary,	  
there	  are	  important	  judgements	  to	  be	  made	  about	  that	  as	  well	  (I	  return	  to	  this	  in	  the	  next	  section).	  
But	   there	   is	   always	   the	  additional	  question	  whether	  our	  means,	  our	  ways	  of	  being	  and	  doing,	  are	  
educationally	  appropriate,	  that	  is,	  whether	  the	  messages	  they	  convey	  –	  implicitly	  or	  explicitly	  –	  are	  
indeed	   the	   messages	   we	   seek	   to	   convey	   (which,	   ideally,	   should	   be	   a	   matter	   of	   congruency,	   but	  
practically	  should	  at	  least	  be	  a	  matter	  where	  the	  means	  do	  not	  contradict	  or	  obstruct	  the	  ends	  we	  
seek	   to	   achieve).	   In	   addition	   to	   a	   technical	   judgement	   about	   the	   effectiveness	   of	   our	   actions	   and	  
arrangements,	   there	   is	   therefore	   always	   also	   a	   need	   for	   a	   judgement	   about	   the	   educational	  
desirability	  of	  our	  actions	  and	  arrangements.	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The	  third	  'moment'	  of	  judgement	  in	  education	  follows	  directly	  from	  the	  multi-­‐dimensional	  nature	  of	  
educational	  purpose,	  because	  although	  there	  are	  interconnections	  between	  the	  three	  domains	  and	  
there	   are,	   therefore,	   possibilities	   for	   synergy	   –	   to	   understand	   something	   can,	   as	   suggested,	  
contribute	  to	  empowerment	  and	  agency	  –	  the	  three	  domains	  are	  not	  seamlessly	  connected,	  so	  that,	  
in	  addition	  to	  opportunities	  for	  synergy,	  there	  is	  also	  a	  real	  chance	  for	  tension	  and	  conflict.	  The	  three	  
domains	   of	   educational	   pull	   us	   as	   educators	   in	   slightly	   (and	   sometimes	   significantly)	   different	  
directions.	  Think,	  for	  example,	  of	  the	  potentially	  damaging	  effects	  in	  the	  domain	  of	  subjectification	  
of	   a	   constant	   high	   pressure	   in	   the	   domain	   of	   qualification,	   that	   is,	   a	   constant	   high	   pressure	   to	  
'perform'	  in	  the	  sphere	  of	  knowledge	  and	  skills.	  That	  is	  why	  in	  each	  educational	  situation	  –	  both	  at	  
the	  general	  level	  of	  educational	  design	  and	  programming	  and	  at	  the	  concrete	  level	  of	  the	  encounter	  
with	   each	   individual	   student	   –	   there	   is,	   on	   the	   one	   hand,	   a	   judgement	   needed	   about	   what	   an	  
educationally	   appropriate	   balance	   between	   the	   three	   domains	  might	   be	   and,	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	  
there	   is	  a	   judgement	  needed	  about	  the	   inevitable	  trade	  offs	  between	  what	  can	  be	  achieved	   in	  the	  
three	  domains.	  It	  is,	  after	  all,	  possible	  to	  achieve	  highly	  in	  each	  of	  the	  domains,	  but	  this	  often	  comes	  
at	   a	   cost	   for	   what	   can	   be	   achieved	   in	   the	   other	   domains	   –	   think	   again	   of	   the	   'price'	   of	   a	   single	  
emphasis	   on	   qualification	   with	   regard	   to	   both	   the	   domain	   of	   subjectification	   and	   the	   domain	   of	  
socialisation	   (with	   regard	   to	   the	   latter	   it	  means,	   for	   example,	   that	  we	   initiate	   our	   students	   into	   a	  
culture	  of	  competition	  rather	  than	  one	  of	  collaboration).	  	  
	  
The	  final	  point	  I	  wish	  to	  make	  is	  that,	  given	  the	  teleological	  character	  of	  education,	  any	  judgements	  
we	  make	  about	  how	  to	  proceed	  –	  that	  is	  any	  judgements	  about	  the	  form	  and	  content	  of	  education	  –	  
once	  we	  have	  come	  to	  an	  understanding	  of	  what	  a	  desirable	  and	  justifiable	  set	  of	  purposes	  for	  our	  
educational	  endeavours	   is,	  have	  to	  be	  understood	  as	  entirely	  pragmatic.	   I	  mean	  pragmatic	  here	   in	  
the	   technical	   sense	   of	   the	   word,	   that	   is,	   where	   we	   judge	   the	   desirability	   of	   an	   educational	  
arrangement	   or	   course	   of	   action	   in	   function	   of	   what	   the	   arrangement	   or	   course	   of	   action	   is	  
supposed	  to	  bring	  about.	  Pragmatic	  judgements	  are	  therefore	  different	  from	  principled	  judgements,	  
where	  we	   judge	   the	  desirability	  of	  an	  arrangement	  or	  course	  of	  action	   just	  on	   the	  qualities	  of	   the	  
arrangement	  or	  course	  of	  action	   itself.	  While	   there	   is	  some	  room	  for	  principled	   judgements	  about	  
the	   form	   and	   content	   of	   education	   in	   that	   we	   do	   not	   want	   them	   to	   be	   in	   any	   way	   unethical	   or	  
immoral,	  apart	  from	  this	  any	  decision	  we	  make	  about	  how	  to	  proceed	  in	  education	  always	  needs	  to	  
be	  taken	  in	  light	  of	  what	  it	  is	  we	  have	  judged	  to	  be	  a	  desirable	  set	  of	  purposes	  for	  our	  activities.	  	  
	  
What	  I	  have	  in	  mind	  here	   is	  very	  practical	  and	  down-­‐to-­‐earth,	  but	  nonetheless	  very	   important	  and	  
often	  overlooked	  in	  educational	  discussions,	  particularly	  when	  a	  new	  fashion	  emerges	  –	  sometimes	  
from	  the	  field	  of	  practice,	  sometimes	  from	  the	  field	  of	  policy,	  sometimes	  from	  the	  field	  of	  theory	  and	  
research	  –	  and	   those	  working	   in	  education	   feel	   forced	  or	  compelled	   to	  adopt	   this	   fashion	  without	  
asking	  what	  it	  might	  be	  good	  for.	  That	  our	  judgements	  ought	  to	  be	  pragmatic	  means,	  therefore,	  that	  
in	   education	   nothing,	   that	   is,	   no	   arrangement,	   no	   course	   of	   action,	   not	   even	   any	   content	   or	  
curriculum,	  is	  desirable	  in	  itself;	  it	  all	  depends	  on	  what	  we	  seek	  to	  achieve	  (and	  of	  course	  on	  how	  we	  
envisage	   that	   a	  particular	   arrangement	  or	   course	  of	   action	  might	   contribute	   to	   the	  purposes	   set).	  
Concretely,	  it	  means	  that	  whether	  education	  should,	  for	  example,	  be	  flexible	  or	  inflexible,	  whether	  it	  
should	  be	  personalised	  or	  general,	  whether	  it	  should	  be	  student-­‐led	  or	  curriculum-­‐led,	  whether	  the	  
aims	   should	   be	   transparent	   and	   visible	   for	   the	   student,	   or	   not	   transparent	   and	   invisible,	  whether	  
education	   should	   be	   easy	   and	   nice	   or	   difficult	   and	   strict,	   and	   perhaps	   even	   whether	   education	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should	  be	  effective	  or	  not,	  is	  not	  something	  we	  can	  decide	  in	  an	  abstract	  sense,	  but	  only	  in	  relation	  
to	  what	  it	  is	  we	  seek	  to	  achieve.	  Pragmatic	  thinking	  can	  help	  us,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  to	  make	  a	  sound	  
educational	  judgement	  about	  any	  new	  idea	  or	  suggestion	  that	  enters	  the	  educational	  domain	  –	  and	  
notions	   such	   as	   flexibility,	   personalisation,	   transparency	   and	   visibility	   are	   currently	   definitely	  
amongst	  the	  more	  fashionable	  ones	  –	  and	  can,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  also	  help	  us	  to	  see	  the	  value	  of	  
ways	   of	   educational	   doing	   that	   are	   all	   too	   quickly	   discredited	   as	   a	   result	   of	   certain	   educational	  
fashions.	   It	   can	   help	   us,	   in	   other	   words,	   to	   develop	   progressive	   arguments	   for	   what,	   from	   the	  
perspective	  of	  fashion	  and	  a	  fetish	  for	  the	  new,	  might	  be	  seen	  as	  conservative	  ideas	  (for	  an	  attempt	  
to	  reclaim	  the	  idea	  of	  teaching	  for	  education,	  see	  Biesta	  2012).	  
	   	  
What	  kinds	  of	  judgement	  do	  we	  need	  in	  teaching?	  Practical	  knowledge	  and	  practical	  wisdom	  
If	  the	  previous	  section	  has	  established	  a	  case	  for	  why	  judgement	  is	  needed	  in	  teaching	  by	  indicating	  
those	   aspects	   of	   the	   practice	   of	   teaching	  where	   a	   judgement	   is	   called	   for,	   the	   question	   I	  wish	   to	  
explore	   in	   this	   section	   is	   at	   a	   slightly	   higher	   level	   of	   abstraction	   and	   has	   to	   do	  with	   the	   kinds	   of	  
judgement	  we	   need	   in	   teaching.5	  My	   guide	   in	   this	   section	  will	   be	   Aristotle	   (384-­‐322	   BC)	   and	   the	  
reason	   for	   turning	   to	   his	   work	   is	   twofold.	   First	   of	   all	   he	   provides	   a	   compelling	   and	   useful	   set	   of	  
concepts	   for	   understanding	   the	   role	   of	   judgement	   in	   teaching.	   Secondly	   he	   provides	   some	  
interesting	  and	  original	  suggestions	  for	  teacher	  education	  through	  his	  ideas	  about	  the	  way	  in	  which	  
we	  develop	  our	  ability	   for	   judgement.	   I	  will	   turn	  to	  the	   latter	  question	   in	  the	  next	  section	  and	  will	  
focus	  here	  on	  Aristotle's	  views	  about	  judgement.	  
	  
While	  in	  the	  previous	  section	  I	  have	  tried	  to	  indicate	  the	  different	  aspects	  and	  'moments'	  of	  teaching	  
where	   judgement	   is	   needed,	   one	   may	   still	   ask	   why	   judgement	   is	   actually	   needed	   in	   teaching.	  
Couldn't	  it	  be	  the	  case,	  so	  a	  critic	  might	  suggest,	  that	  we	  only	  need	  judgement	  as	  long	  as	  there	  are	  
aspects	   of	   teaching	   where	   we	   lack	   sufficient	   knowledge	   but	   that,	   with	   the	   advancement	   of	   the	  
science	  of	  teaching,	  we	  will	  eventually	  reach	  a	  point	  where	  we	  no	   longer	  need	   judgement	  but	  can	  
proceed	  with	  certainty?	  One	  argument	  against	   the	   idea	  of	   the	  sufficiency	  of	  a	  science	  of	   teaching,	  
that	   is,	  of	  a	  conception	  of	  research	  that	  seeks	  to	  cover	  all	   the	  possible	  aspects	  of	  teaching,	  can	  be	  
found	  in	  the	  work	  of	  William	  James	  (1842-­‐1910)	  who	  in	  his	  Talks	  to	  Teachers	  made	  the	  point	  in	  the	  
following	  way.	  
	  
Psychology	   is	  a	  science,	  and	  teaching	   is	  an	  art;	  and	  sciences	  never	  generate	  arts	  
directly	   out	   of	   themselves.	   An	   intermediary	   inventive	   mind	   must	   make	   the	  
application,	  by	  using	  its	  originality.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  The	  argument	  I	  am	  developing	  in	  this	  chapter	  focuses	  on	  how	  we	  might	  understand	  teaching	  and	  
what	   such	   an	   understanding	   implies	   for	   the	   role	   of	   the	   teacher.	   The	   understanding	   I	   put	   forward	  
focuses	  on	  the	  role	  of	  judgement	  in	  teaching,	  and	  thus	  highlights	  the	  crucial	  importance	  of	  teachers’	  
judgement.	  My	  focus	   is	  on	  the	   implications	  of	  this	  understanding	  for	  teacher	  education.	  There	   is	  a	  
further	  question	  that	  falls	  outside	  of	  the	  scope	  of	  this	  chapter,	  which	  is	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  teachers	  
are	  able	   to	  exercise	   the	   judgements	   that,	   in	  my	  view,	  are	  crucial	   for	  any	  educationally	  meaningful	  
teaching.	   This	   question	   partly	   has	   to	   do	   with	   the	   self-­‐understanding	   teachers	   have	   of	   their	   own	  
profession	  and	  professional	  scope	  for	  action,	  but	  is	  of	  course	  also	  highly	  influenced	  by	  the	  concrete	  
environments	  in	  which	  teachers	  work	  –	  environments	  that	  nowadays	  often	  only	  offer	  little	  scope	  for	  
teacher	  judgement	  (see	  also	  Priestley,	  Biesta	  &	  Robinson	  in	  press).	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The	   most	   such	   sciences	   can	   do	   is	   to	   help	   us	   to	   catch	   ourselves	   up	   and	   check	  
ourselves,	   if	  we	   start	   to	   reason	  or	   to	   behave	  wrongly;	   and	   to	   criticize	   ourselves	  
more	  articulately	  after	  we	  have	  made	  mistakes.	  	  
	  
To	  know	  psychology,	  therefore,	  is	  absolutely	  no	  guarantee	  that	  we	  shall	  be	  good	  
teachers.	   To	   advance	   to	   that	   result,	   we	   must	   have	   an	   additional	   endowment	  
altogether,	  a	  happy	  tact	  and	  ingenuity	  to	  tell	  us	  what	  definite	  things	  to	  say	  and	  do	  
when	  the	  pupil	  is	  before	  us.	  That	  ingenuity	  in	  meeting	  and	  pursuing	  the	  pupil,	  that	  
tact	   for	   the	   concrete	   situation,	   though	   they	   are	   the	   alpha	   and	   omega	   of	   the	  
teacher's	  art,	  are	  things	  to	  which	  psychology	  cannot	  help	  us	  in	  the	  least.	  (James,	  
1899,	  pp.14-­‐15)	  
	  
The	  point	  James	  makes	  here	  could	  be	  characterized	  as	  an	  epistemological	  point,	  as	  he	  indicates	  the	  
gap	   between	   the	   general	   knowledge	   the	   science	   of	   psychology	   can	   generate	   and	   the	   specific	  
knowledge	  the	  teacher	  needs	  in	  each	  concrete	  situation.	  Looking	  at	  it	  in	  this	  way,	  we	  could	  say	  that	  
the	   knowledge	   science	   can	   generate	   about	   teaching	   is	   never	   sufficient.	  Or,	   looking	   at	   it	   from	   the	  
other	   side,	   such	   knowledge	   can	   never	   tell	   teachers	  what	   they	   should	   do,	   but	   can	   at	  most	   inform	  
their	  judgements.	  Whereas	  this	  line	  of	  thought	  leaves	  open	  the	  possibility	  that	  a	  science	  of	  teaching	  
might	   be	   possible	   –	   and	   in	   a	   sense	   only	   makes	   the	   point	   that	   scientific	   knowledge	   and	   practical	  
knowledge	  are	  of	   a	  different	   category	  –	  Aristotle	   goes	  one	   step	   further	  by	  arguing	   that	   there	   is	   a	  
fundamental	  difference	  between	  what	  he	  refers	  to	  as	  the	  theoretical	  life	  (the	  'bios	  theoretikos')	  and	  
the	   practical	   life	   (the	   'bios	   praktikos').	   This	   suggests	   that	   his	   argument	   is	   not	   epistemological	   but	  
ontological	  as	   it	  asks	  what	  kind	  of	  reality	  teaching	  is	  or,	  to	  be	  more	  precise,	   in	  what	  kind	  of	  reality	  
teaching	  takes	  place.	  
	  
Aristotle	   conceives	   of	   the	   theoretical	   life	   as	   having	   to	   do	   with	   “the	   necessary	   and	   the	   eternal”	  
(Aristotle	   1980,	   p.140),	   that	   is,	   with	   those	   parts	   of	   reality	   that	   do	   not	   change.	   He	   refers	   to	   the	  
knowledge	   that	   is	   at	   stake	   here	   as	   'episteme'	  which	   is	   often	   translated	   as	   'science'	   (although	   the	  
translation	  is	  a	  bit	  misleading	  as	  it	  suggests	  that	  science	  is	  an	  epistemological	  category	  –	  an	  idea	  well	  
refuted	  by	  authors	  such	  as	  Karl	  Popper,	  Stephen	  Toulmin,	  Thomas	  Kuhn	  and	  Bruno	  Latour).	  We	  can	  
think	   of	   episteme	   as	   representational	   knowledge	   about	   an	   unchanging	   world	   'out	   there'	   and	   the	  
connection	   Aristotle	   makes	   between	   episteme	   and	   the	   eternal	   suggests	   that	   it	   is,	   in	   principle,	  
possible	   to	   generate	   knowledge	   that	   is	   100%	   certain	   and	   true,	   simply	   because	   its	   object	   is	   in	   the	  
domain	  of	   the	  necessary	  and	   the	  eternal.	  Teaching,	  however,	   is	  not	   something	   that	   takes	  place	   in	  
this	   domain.	   It	   rather	   belongs	   to	   the	   practical	   life,	  which	  Aristotle	   refers	   to	   as	   the	   domain	   of	   the	  
"variable"	  (ibid.,	  p.	  142),	  that	  is,	  the	  domain	  of	  change	  and	  possibility.	  It	  is	  the	  world	  in	  which	  we	  act	  
and	   in	  which	   our	   actions	  make	   a	   difference.	  What	   is	   interesting	   about	  Aristotle's	   ideas	   about	   our	  
activities	  in	  the	  domain	  of	  the	  variable	  is	  that	  he	  makes	  a	  distinction	  between	  two	  'modes'	  of	  acting	  
(and	  hence	  two	  forms	  or	  kinds	  of	  judgement;	  see	  below),	  one	  to	  which	  he	  refers	  as	  poiesis	  and	  one	  
to	  which	  he	  refers	  as	  praxis	  or,	  in	  Carr’s	  (1987)	  translation,	  ‘making	  action’	  and	  ‘doing	  action.’	  Both	  
modes	  of	  action	  require	  judgement,	  but	  the	  kind	  of	  judgement	  needed	  is	  radically	  different,	  and	  this	  
is	  an	  important	  insight	  for	  the	  art	  of	  education.	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Poiesis	   is	  about	  the	  production	  or	  fabrication	  of	  things	  –	  such	  as,	  for	  example,	  a	  saddle	  or	  a	  ship	  –	  
although	   I	   prefer	   to	   think	   of	   it	   slightly	  more	  widely,	   that	   is,	   as	   action	   that	   brings	   something	   into	  
existence	  (see	  below).	  It	  is,	  as	  Aristotle	  puts	  it,	  about	  “how	  something	  may	  come	  into	  being	  which	  is	  
capable	  of	  either	  being	  or	  not	  being”	  (which	  means	  that	   it	   is	  about	  the	  variable,	  not	  about	  what	   is	  
eternal	  and	  necessary),	  and	  about	  things	  “whose	  origin	  is	   in	  the	  maker	  and	  not	  in	  the	  thing	  made”	  
(which	  distinguishes	  poiesis	  from	  biological	  phenomena	  such	  as	  growth	  and	  development)	  (Aristotle,	  
1980,	  p.	  141).	  Poiesis	  is,	  in	  short,	  about	  the	  creation	  of	  something	  that	  did	  not	  exist	  before.	  The	  kind	  
of	  knowledge	  we	  need	  for	  poiesis	  is	  techne	  (usually	  translated	  as	  ‘art,’	  although	  this	  translation	  is	  a	  
little	  misleading	  and	  unhelpful	  as	  it	  is	  actually	  about	  the	  kind	  of	  knowledge	  and	  judgement	  we	  need	  
in	  the	  domain	  of	  poiesis).	  Unlike	  episteme,	  which	  is	  knowledge	  about	  what	  is	  and	  how	  it	  is,	  techne	  is	  
“knowledge	  of	  how	  to	  make	  things”	   (ibid,	  p.141).	  Techne	   thus	   is	  about	   finding	  the	  means	  that	  will	  
bring	  about	  what	  one	  seeks	  to	  bring	  about	  or	  bring	  into	  existence.	  It	  encompasses	  knowledge	  about	  
the	  materials	  we	  work	  with	  and	  about	   the	   techniques	  we	  can	  apply	   to	  work	  with	   those	  materials.	  
But	  making	  something,	  such	  as	  a	  saddle	  is	  never	  about	  simply	  following	  a	  recipe.	  It	  involves	  making	  
judgements	  about	  the	  application	  of	  our	  general	  knowledge	  to	  this	  piece	  of	   leather,	  for	  this	  horse,	  
and	   for	   this	   person	   riding	   the	   horse.	   So	   we	  make	   judgements	   about	   application,	   production	   and	  
effectiveness	  in	  our	  attempts	  to	  bring	  something	  into	  existence.	  	  
	  
The	  domain	  of	   the	  variable	   is,	  however,	  not	  confined	   to	   the	  world	  of	   things,	  but	  also	   includes	   the	  
social	  world;	  the	  world	  of	  human	  action	  and	  interaction.	  It	  is	  here	  that	  a	  second	  art	  is	  called	  for	  –	  the	  
art	   of	   praxis.	   The	   orientation	   here	   is	   not	   towards	   the	   production	   of	   things	   but	   towards	   the	  
promotion	  of	  human	  flourishing	  (eudamonia).	  Praxis,	  Aristotle	  writes,	   is	  “about	  what	  sort	  of	  things	  
conduce	  to	  the	  good	  life	  in	  general”	  (ibid,	  p.142).	  We	  could	  say	  that	  praxis	  is	  about	  good	  action,	  but	  
good	  action	  is	  here	  not	  to	  be	  understood	  as	  a	  means	  for	  bringing	  about	  something	  else	  –	  that	  is	  the	  
domain	  of	  poiesis	  which	   "has	   an	  end	  other	   than	   itself"	   (ibid.,	   p.143).	   "Good	  action,"	   on	   the	  other	  
hand,	  “itself	  is	  its	  end”	  (ibid,	  p.143).	  The	  kind	  of	  judgement	  we	  need	  here	  is	  therefore	  not	  about	  how	  
things	   should	   be	   done.	   We	   rather	   need	   judgement	   “about	  what	   is	   to	   be	   done”	   (ibid;	   emphasis	  
added).	   Aristotle	   refers	   to	   this	   kind	   of	   judgement	   as	   phronesis,	   which	   is	   usually	   translated	   as	  
practical	  wisdom.	  Aristotle	  gives	  the	  following,	  more	  precise	  definition	  of	  phronesis	  as	  a	  “reasoned	  
and	  true	  state	  of	  capacity	  to	  act	  with	  regard	  to	  human	  goods”	  (ibid,	  p.143).	  
	  
Aristotle's	  reflections	  on	  the	  domain	  of	  the	  variable	  and	  the	  different	  modes	  of	  action	  within	  it	  are	  
important	  for	  understanding	  the	  role	  of	  judgement	  in	  education	  in	  a	  more	  precise	  manner.	  The	  first	  
and	  perhaps	  most	  important	  point	  to	  make	  in	  relation	  to	  this,	  is	  to	  say	  that	  we	  should	  never	  think	  of	  
education	   just	   in	   terms	   of	   poiesis	   but	   always	   also	   in	   terms	   of	   praxis.	   While	   education	   is	   clearly	  
located	   in	  the	  domain	  of	  the	  variable,	   it	   is	  concerned	  with	  the	   interaction	  between	  human	  beings,	  
not	   the	   interaction	  between	  human	  beings	  and	  the	  material	  world.	  Our	  students	  are	  never	  simply	  
objects,	  but	  are	  always	  to	  be	  seen	  and	  treated	  as	  human	  beings	  in	  their	  own	  right,	  that	  is	  as	  subjects.	  
Yet	  this	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  we	  should	  exclude	  the	  idea	  of	  poiesis	  from	  our	  educational	  thinking.	  (I	  
am	  responding	  here	  to	  authors	   in	  the	  educational	   literature	  who	  tend	  to	  overemphasise	  phronesis	  
and	  underemphasise	  –	  or	   in	  some	  cases	  even	  reject	  –	  techne	  as	  being	  educationally	   relevant;	  see,	  
for	  example,	  Heilbronn	  2008,	  chapter	  5;	  Hillier	  2012,	  chapter	  1.)	  	  After	  all,	  we	  do	  want	  our	  teaching	  
and	  our	  curricula	  to	  have	  effect	  and	  be	  effective	  and	  we	  do	  want	  our	  students	  to	  achieve,	  both	   in	  
the	  domain	  of	  qualification	  and	   in	   the	  domain	  of	  socialization.	  But	   that	  should	  never	  be	  the	  be	  all	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and	  end	  all	  of	  education,	  because	  we	  also	  want	  our	  students	  to	  flourish	  as	  human	  beings	  –	  which	  is	  
the	   question	   of	   praxis	   –	   which	   is	   perhaps	   an	   interest	   first	   of	   all	   located	   in	   the	   domain	   of	  
subjectification,	   although	   we	   could	   also	   say	   that	   this	   is	   precisely	   where	   the	   interest	   in	  
subjectification	   intersects	   with	   both	   qualification	   and	   socialization	   (for	   example	   in	   the	   difference	  
between	   what	   we	   might	   call	   subjectivity-­‐reducing	   and	   subjectivity-­‐promoting	   qualification	   and	  
subjectivity-­‐reducing	  and	  subjectivity-­‐promoting	  socialization).	  
	  
The	  second	  point	  that	  follows	  from	  these	  considerations	   is	  that	  with	  Aristotle	  we	  can	  now	  identify	  
the	   two	  difference	   kinds	   or	  modes	   of	   judgement	   that	   are	   needed	   in	   education.	  On	   the	   one	   hand	  
judgement	  plays	  a	  role	  in	  the	  domain	  of	  poiesis,	  the	  domain	  concerned	  with	  bringing	  something	  into	  
existence	  –	  and	  I	  have	  carefully	  used	  the	  phrase	  'bringing	  something	  into	  existence'	  rather	  than	  the	  
cruder	   notion	   of	   production	   or	   technology,	   because	   I	   wish	   to	   highlight	   that	   poiesis	   is	   not	   to	   be	  
understood	  in	  terms	  of	  mechanical	  or	  even	  mechanistic	  and	  machine-­‐like	  production,	  but	  rather	   is	  
to	   be	   understood	   as	   a	   creative	   act	   and	   an	   act	   of	   creation	  where	  we	   do	   aim	   to	   bring	   'things'	   into	  
existence	  that	  did	  not	  exist	  before	  (see	  also	  Biesta	  2013,	  chapter	  1).	  The	  judgements	  we	  need	  here	  
are	   judgements	   about	   how	   to	   do	   things	   and	   we	   have	   to	   acknowledge	   that	   these	   are	   indeed	  
judgements,	   because	   in	   the	   domain	   of	   the	   variable	   we	   are	  working	  with	   unpredictable	   'material'	  
which	  means	   that	   the	   results	   of	   our	   activities	   here	   will	   always	   and	   necessarily	   have	   a	   degree	   of	  
uncertainty.	  This	   is	  not	  an	  uncertainty	   that	  at	   some	  point	   in	   time	  can	  be	  overcome	  once	  we	  have	  
enough	  knowledge	  of	  all	   factors	  and	  dimensions	  of	  education.	   It	   is	  an	  uncertainty	  that	  stems	  from	  
the	   very	   fact	   that	   education,	   as	   an	   interaction	   between	   living	   human	   beings,	   is	   in	   a	   fundamental	  
sense	  open	  towards	  the	  future	  (which	  means	  that	  the	  only	  way	  to	  reduce	  this	  radical	  openness	  is	  by	  
taking	  the	  'human	  factor'	  out	  of	  education).	  In	  addition	  to	  judgements	  about	  how	  to	  do	  things,	  we	  
need	  judgements	  about	  what	  is	  to	  be	  done	  as	  the	  ultimate	  orientation	  of	  all	  education	  should	  be	  to	  
the	  well-­‐being	  and	  flourishing	  of	  our	  students,	  not	   in	  some	  kind	  of	  narrow,	   instrumental	  way	  –	  for	  
example	  orientated	  towards	  making	  our	  students	   'happy'	  or	   'satisfied'	  –	  but	  by	  contributing	  to	  the	  
possibility	  of	   leading	  a	  worthy,	  meaningful	  human	   life	   (on	   the	  notion	  of	  worthiness	   see	  Gur	   Ze'ev	  
2010,	  pp.	  11-­‐28).	  Both	  forms	  of	  judgement	  can	  be	  called	  'practical,'	  as	  they	  both	  are	  concerned	  with	  
acting	  in	  the	  domain	  of	  the	  variable.	  Perhaps	  the	  first	  could	  be	  called	  practical	  knowledge	  –	  as	  it	   is	  
knowledge	  about	  how	  to	  operate	  effectively	  in	  the	  domain	  of	  the	  variable	  –	  whereas	  the	  second	  can	  
be	  called	  practical	  wisdom	  (which	  is	  the	  common	  translation	  of	  the	  word	  'phronesis')	  –	  as	  it	  is	  about	  
the	   ability	   to	   judge	  what	   is	   to	   be	   done	   in	   a	   given	   situation,	  which	   is	   the	   question	   of	   educational	  
purpose(s)	  as	  discussed	  above.	  
	  
How	  can	  teachers	  become	  capable	  of	  educational	  judgement?	  
In	  the	  previous	  sections	  I	  have	  tried	  to	  make	  clear	  why	  we	  need	  judgement	  in	  education,	  where	  we	  
need	  judgement	  in	  education,	  and	  what	  kinds	  of	  judgement	  we	  need	  in	  education.	  I	  have,	  following	  
Aristotle,	   argued	   that	   education	   has	   both	   poiesis	   and	   praxis	   dimensions,	   so	   that	   we	   both	   need	  
judgement	  about	  how	  to	  do	  things	  (techne)	  and	  judgement	  about	  what	  is	  to	  be	  done	  (phronesis).	   I	  
have	  also	  argued	  that	  because	  of	  the	  teleological	  nature	  of	  education,	  that	  is,	  the	  fact	  that	  education	  
is	   constituted	   by	   purposes	   –	   and	   precisely	   here	   education	   is	   different	   from	   learning	   –	   all	   our	  
educational	   actions	   and	   activities	   are	   ultimately	   'framed'	   by	   our	   considered	   views	   about	   what	  
education	  is	  for.	  And	  this	  question	  is	  not	  only	  an	  abstract	  question	  at	  the	  level	  of	  education	  policy	  or	  
curriculum	  theory,	  but	   is	   (also)	  a	  concrete	  question	  that	  returns	  again	  and	  again	   in	  every	  concrete	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moment	  of	  teaching.	  It	  is	  one	  of	  the	  reasons	  why	  all	  our	  judgements	  in	  education	  ultimately	  need	  to	  
be	  pragmatic	  –	  that	  is	  connected	  to	  the	  question	  what	  the	  activity	  is	  for.	  And,	  given	  that	  the	  purpose	  
of	   education	   is	  multi-­‐dimensional,	   always	   also	   raises	   questions	   about	   balance,	   tensions	   and	   trade	  
offs	  between	  the	  three	  domains	  of	  educational	  purpose.	  All	  this	  means	  that	  the	  ability	  to	  judge	  and	  
to	   do	   so	   in	   an	   educational	   way	   –	   which	   means	   to	   ask	   with	   everything	   we	   do	   whether	   it	   is	  
educationally	  desirable	  –	   is	   absolutely	   central	   for	   good	   teaching.	   This	   is	  why	   it	   also	   should	  have	  a	  
central	   role	   in	   teacher	  education.	  But	  how	  should	  we	  understand	  the	   'ability'	   to	  make	  educational	  
judgements?	  And	  how	  can	  we	  support	  teachers	  in	  'developing'	  this	  'ability'?	  It	  is	  here	  that	  I	  will	  turn	  
one	  more	  time	  to	  Aristotle.6	  
	  
While	  practical	  knowledge	  (techne)	  plays	  an	  important	  role	  in	  teaching,	  all	   judgements	  we	  make	  in	  
relation	  to	  how	  we	  should	  proceed	  are	  ultimately	  framed	  by	  judgements	  about	  what	  is	  to	  be	  done,	  
which	   is	   the	  domain	  of	  practical	  wisdom	  (phronesis).	  While	   it	   is	   important	   for	   teachers	   to	  develop	  
their	   ability	   for	   judgement	  with	   regard	   to	   the	   question	   how	   to	   act,	   the	   underlying	   need	   –	  which	  
precisely	  marks	  the	  difference	  between	  a	  competent	  teacher	  and	  a	  good	  teacher	  –	  has	  to	  do	  with	  
the	   ability	   to	   make	   judgements	   about	   what	   is	   educationally	   desirable.	   For	   this	   teachers	   need	  
practical	  wisdom	  (phronesis).	  While	  some	  try	  to	  suggest	  that	  practical	  wisdom	  is	  itself	  a	  competence	  
–	  that	  is,	  something	  a	  teacher	  can	  acquire	  and	  then	  possess	  –	  Aristotle	  argues,	  and	  this	  is	  the	  lead	  I	  
will	  follow	  here,	  that	  practical	  wisdom	  should	  be	  understood	  as	  a	  quality	  or	  excellence	  of	  the	  person.	  
It	  is	  therefore	  in	  the	  domain	  of	  being	  not	  the	  domain	  of	  having.	  The	  question	  for	  teacher	  education,	  
therefore,	  is	  not	  the	  question	  how	  a	  student	  can	  acquire	  practical	  wisdom;	  it	  rather	  is	  the	  question	  
how	  the	  student	  can	  become	  educationally	  wise	  Or	  in	  Aristotle's	  terms:	  the	  question	  is	  not	  how	  the	  
teacher	   can	   acquire	   phronesis,	   but	   how	   the	   teacher	   can	   become	   a	   phronimos,	   a	   practically	   (and	  
educationally)	  wise	   person	   (on	   this	   distinction	   see	   also	   Biesta	   2013a).	  What	  we	   are	   talking	   about	  
here	  is	  what	  in	  Greek	  is	  called	  ἀρετή	  and	  in	  English	  is	  often	  translated	  as	  virtue	  or	  character.	  While	  
both	   words	   have	   problematic	   sides	   –	   and	   particularly	   the	   notion	   of	   'character'	   has,	   through	  
discussions	   on	   character	   education,	   been	   made	   into	   an	   aim	   for	   rather	   strict	   and	   reproductive	  
socialization	   –	  what	  we	   have	  with	   the	   idea	   of	   ἀρετή	   is	   not	   a	   skill	   or	   cognitive	   faculty,	   but	   rather	  
something	  that	  characterises	  the	  way	  of	  being	  and	  acting	  of	  a	  person.	  It	  is	  a	  quality	  that	  permeates	  
how	  the	  person	  is	  and	  acts	  which	  means	  that,	  in	  more	  modern	  terms,	  it	  is	  a	  holistic	  and	  embodied	  
quality.	   So	  how	  can	   student	   teachers	  become	  educationally	  wise?	  Aristotle	  makes	   two	   interesting	  
points	  in	  relation	  to	  this	  question.	  The	  first	  is	  his	  observation	  “that	  a	  young	  man	  of	  practical	  wisdom	  
cannot	  be	  found”	  (Aristotle	  1980,	  p.148),	  which	  suggests	  that	  practical	  wisdom	  comes	  with	  age	  or,	  
to	   be	  more	   precise,	   that	   it	   comes	  with	   experience.	   The	   second	   is	   that	   Aristotle	   does	   not	   provide	  
abstract	  definitions	  of	  what	  practical	  wisdom	  looks	  like,	  but	  rather	  tries	  to	  make	  this	  clear	  through	  
examples,	  that	  is,	  to	  referring	  to	  those	  who	  exemplify	  phronesis	  in	  a	  particular	  domain.	  Taking	  all	  this	  
together	  I	  would	  like	  to	  conclude	  with	  three	  'reference	  points'	  for	  teacher	  education:	  a	  focus	  on	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  In	  what	  follows	  I	  provide	  a	  particular	  interpretation	  of	  Aristotle	  that	  I	  find	  useful	  for	  the	  point	  I	  wish	  
to	  make	  about	  teacher	  education.	  For	  this	  I	  focus	  on	  phronesis	  and	  the	  idea	  of	  virtue	  in	  Aristotle.	  The	  
question	   I	   leave	  aside	   in	   this	  discussion	   is	  about	   the	  status	  of	  techne	   and	   the	  extent	   to	  which	   this	  
does	  or	  does	  not	  belong	   to	   the	   intellectual	  virtues.	   In	   some	  places	  Aristotle	  does	   include	   it,	   yet	   in	  
other	  places	  he	  does	  not	  –	  which	  raises	  further	  questions	  about	  (the	  different	  interpretations	  of)	  the	  
distinction	  between	  episteme	  and	  techne	  in	  Aristotle's	  work.	  For	  a	  helpful	  discussion	  see	  Parry	  2008.	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formation	   of	   character	   or	   educational	   virtuosity;	   a	   focus	   on	   practising	   judgement;	   and	   a	   focus	  
engagement	  with	  examples	  of	  educational	  virtuosity.	  	  
	  
The	  first	  point	  is	  that	  teacher	  education	  should	  be	  understood	  as	  a	  process	  of	  the	  formation	  of	  the	  
person	  –	  not,	  that	  is,	  the	  individual	  person,	  but	  the	  person	  as	  professional.	  This	  means	  that	  in	  terms	  
of	   the	   three	   domains	   of	   educational	   purpose,	   we	   should	   not	   confine	   teacher	   education	   to	   the	  
domain	  of	  qualification	  –	  to	  just	  providing	  teachers	  with	  the	  knowledge	  and	  skills	  they	  need	  –	  nor	  to	  
the	   domain	   of	   socialisation	   –	   that	   is,	   just	   initiating	   them	   into	   the	   (existing)	   professional	   culture.	  
While	  such	  paths	  may	  bring	  about	  teachers	  who	  are	  competent,	  they	  may	  not	  result	  in	  teachers	  who	  
are	  good,	  precisely	  because	  they	  may	  lack	  the	  embodied	  ability	  to	  place	  their	  knowledge,	  skills	  and	  
ways	  of	  doing	  within	  the	  wider	  context	  of	  the	  question	  what	  is	  to	  be	  done,	  the	  question,	  as	  to	  what	  
is	  educationally	  desirable.	  To	  make	  that	  question	  the	  centre	  of	  one's	  professional	  action	  as	  a	  teacher	  
requires	   that	   this	   question	   –	   and	   the	   ability	   to	   engage	   with	   it	   in	   a	   meaningful	   way	   –	   permeates	  
everything	  one	  does.	  	  We	  could	  say,	  therefore,	  that	  teacher	  education	  should	  focus	  on	  the	  formation	  
of	  educational	  character.	  However,	  given	  potentially	  problematic	  connotations	  of	  that	  word,	  I	  prefer	  
to	  describe	  the	  approach	  I	  have	  been	  outlining	  here	  as	  a	  virtue-­‐based	  approach,	  that	  is,	  an	  approach	  
aimed	  at	  the	  formation	  of	  educational	  virtuous	  professionals.	  To	  play	  a	  little	  with	  the	  word	  'virtue,'	  
we	   could	   rephrase	   this	   as	   a	   concern	   for	   the	   education	   of	   professionals	   whose	   ways	   of	   acting	  
exemplify	   educational	   virtuosity,	   that	   is,	   embodied	   educational	   wisdom:	   the	   embodied	   ability	   to	  
make	  wise	  educational	   judgements	  about	  what	   is	   to	  be	  done,	   that	   is,	   about	  what	   is	  educationally	  
desirable.	   As	   I	   have	   tried	   to	  make	   clear	   throughout	   this	   chapter,	   such	   a	   virtue-­‐based	   approach	   is	  
significantly	   different	   both	   from	   a	   competence-­‐based	   approach	   and	   an	   evidence-­‐based	   approach.	  
When	   we	   think	   of	   how	   musicians	   develop	   their	   virtuosity	   we	   can	   see	   two	   other	   important	  
dimensions	   of	   a	   virtue-­‐based	   approach,	  which	   give	   us	   the	   other	   two	   reference	   points	   for	   teacher	  
education.	  
	  
The	   second	   is	   that	  we	   can	   only	   develop	   our	   virtuosity	   for	   educational	  wisdom	   by	   practising	   such	  
judgement,	   that	   is,	   by	   being	   engaged	   in	   the	   practice	   of	   judgement	   from	   the	   very	   start	   of	   our	  
formation	  as	  teachers.	  The	  question	  as	  to	  what	  is	  educationally	  desirable	  is,	  to	  put	  it	  differently,	  not	  
a	  question	  that	  should	  come	  at	  the	  very	  end	  of	  teacher	  education,	  once	  all	  the	  knowledge,	  skills	  and	  
competences	   have	   been	   acquired,	   but	   should	   be	   there	   from	   day	   one	   –	   perhaps	   on	   the	   simple	  
principle	  that	  if	  you	  want	  to	  learn	  to	  play	  the	  piano	  there	  is	  no	  point	  in	  starting	  on	  a	  flute;	  you	  have	  
to	  engage	  with	   the	  piano,	   its	   challenges,	   complexities	  and	  difficulties	   from	  day	  one	   if	   you	  want	   to	  
become	  a	  good	  piano	  player.	  It	   is	  perhaps	  important	  to	  emphasise	  that	  this	  is	  not	  an	  argument	  for	  
training	   on	   the	   job.	   It	   is	   only	   an	   argument	   for	   saying	   that	   if	   our	   ultimate	   aim	   is	   the	   formation	   of	  
educational	  wisdom,	  of	  educationally	  wise	  teachers,	  this	  needs	  to	  permeate	  the	  teacher	  education	  
curriculum	  from	  the	  very	  start.	  	  
	  
The	   third	   reference	   point	   that	   follows	   from	   my	   considerations	   is	   the	   importance	   of	   developing	  
educational	  virtuosity	  through	  examples,	  that	  is,	  through	  studying	  the	  virtuosity	  of	  others,	  precisely	  
because	  we	  are	  not	  talking	  about	  an	  abstract	  skill,	  but	  an	  embodied	  and	  situated	  way	  of	  doing,	  so	  it	  
requires	  careful	   study	  of	   those	  who	  we	  might	  see	  as	  good	  –	  or	   for	   that	  matter	  –	  bad	  examples	  of	  
having	  become	  educationally	  wise.	  Again,	  this	  is	  not	  an	  argument	  for	  training	  on	  the	  shop	  floor,	  and	  
also	   not	   for	   fashionable	   idea	   of	   peer	   learning.	   It	   is	   precisely	   the	   difficult	   task	   of	   studying	   the	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virtuosity	  of	  experienced	  educators,	   trying	  to	  see	  how	  it	   functions,	  how	  it	   is	  embodied,	  where	   it	   is	  
done	  explicitly,	  where	  it	  is	  held	  back	  precisely	  for	  educational	  reasons,	  and	  so	  on.	  Such	  a	  trajectory	  
of	   study	   requires	   careful	   attention	   to	   detail,	   and	   thus	   requires	   time	   and	   a	   need	   for	   deepening,	  
because	  what	  we	  may	  be	  able	  to	  see	  the	  first	  time	  we	  look	  may	  become	  very	  different	  from	  what	  	  
we	  might	  be	  able	  to	  see	  the	  second	  time	  we	  look,	  and	  so	  on.	  	  
	  
Concluding	  comments	  
In	  this	  chapter	  I	  have	  tried	  to	  answer	  the	  question	  how	  a	  competent	  teacher	  might	  become	  a	  good	  
teacher.	   I	  have	  suggested	  that	  the	  difference	  between	  a	  competent	  and	  a	  good	  teacher	   lies	   in	  the	  
ability	  to	  bring	  judgement	  to	  the	  task	  of	  teaching.	  I	  have,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  tried	  to	  indicate	  why	  and	  
where	   teaching	  needs	   judgement	  and	  have,	  on	   the	  other	  hand,	   tried	   to	  make	   clear	  what	   kinds	  of	  
judgement	  teachers	  need.	  Against	  this	  background	  I	  have	  made	  a	  case	  for	  a	  virtue-­‐based	  rather	  than	  
a	  competence-­‐based	  or	  evidence-­‐based	  conception	  of	  teaching	  and	  teacher	  education	  and	  have,	  in	  
relation	   to	   the	   latter	   domain,	   highlighted	   the	   importance	   of	   working	   on	   educational	   virtuosity	   in	  
order	   for	   teachers	   to	   become	   educationally	   wise.	   Initial	   teacher	   education	   has	   an	   important	   and	  
unique	   role	   to	   play	   in	   this,	   and	   I	   have	   provided	   a	   number	   of	   reference	   points	   for	   such	   forms	   of	  
teacher	   education.	   Nonetheless	   I	   believe	   that	   teachers	   can	   continue	   to	   grow	   in	   their	   educational	  
wisdom,	  and	   in	   this	   regard	   the	  question	  what	   is	  educationally	  desirable	   is	  one	   that	   should	   remain	  
central	  throughout	  their	  teaching	  career.	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